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Institutional Liability in the E-Health Era
James Williams* and Craig Kuziemsky**
INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that health care has changed markedly from the traditional
“single patient, single physician” model, certain areas of medical malpractice have
remained remarkably static. One commentator has gone so far as to claim that
“there have been few (if any) changes of any real significance in health care liabil-
ity over the last 50 years.”1 In fact, the jurisprudence concerning institutional liabil-
ity for medical error seems to show few signs of having evolved beyond its tradi-
tional formulation in the early 20th century. Given the relatively primitive nature of
health care delivery at this point in history, it is worth asking whether the jurispru-
dence from this era has been deprecated by joint advances in technology and health
care delivery methods.
This paper examines the jurisprudence on institutional liability for medical er-
ror. We argue that the existing jurisprudence relies on assumptions that have been
made obsolete by technological advances. In particular, we concentrate on the use
of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the health care domain.
As we demonstrate, the use of these tools does not merely increase efficiency and
support new health care functions; among other effects, ICT can have a profound
influence on how health care practitioners make observations, exercise judgment
and perform tasks. These tools influence human capabilities (at both the individual
and systems level) in ways that are not recognized in the jurisprudence or scholarly
literature on health law.
As the development, deployment and operation of health care ICT is the pre-
rogative of health care organizations (e.g., hospitals) and governments or their
agencies (i.e., health authorities), health care practitioners have little control over
these tools. Since ICT can be the cause of medical errors at the systems level, it
seems appropriate for jurists and lawmakers to take a fresh look at the liability of
systems-level actors like institutions, standards bodies and governments.
In fact, we believe that the existing jurisprudence on institutional liability must
be reconsidered, as some of its underlying assumptions have been outpaced by de-
velopments in technology, clinical practice and systems engineering. This is not
* James Williams, B.A., B.Sc., J.D., M.Sc., Ph.D. (cand.) is a privacy and security
consultant with the Community Care Information Management program in Toronto,
and a graduate student at the University of Victoria’s Faculty of Engineering.
** Craig Kuziemsky, B.Sc., B.Com., Ph.D. is an Associate Professor and Director of the
M.Sc. program in Health Systems at the Telfer School of Management, University of
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1 G.B. Robertson, “A View of the Future” (2008) Health Law J. 1. Robertson notes that
there is little reason to suspect that there will be any doctrinal changes of “real signifi-
cance” in the next 50 years either.
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merely an academic exercise. We believe that systems level errors will become
more common, and failing to hold the actors who design, implement and maintain
ICT will lead to serious consequences.
In this paper, we do not set out a positive program for changes to the law of
institutional liability. Our goal is merely to point out that the status quo is inade-
quate from an intellectual, practical and moral standpoint. The first section of this
paper discusses the traditional approaches to institutional liability in health care —
namely, direct duties and vicarious liability. After summarizing the jurisprudence,
we shift our attention to the use of ICT in the health care domain. We outline key
themes, and identify some of the major efforts underway in Canada to provide new
technologies. In the next section, we argue that the jurisprudence concerning insti-
tutional liability is based on dated assumptions; in particular, we show that ICT can
have subtle yet profound effects on health care practitioners. Arguing that the sys-
tem-level errors that arise in these contexts cannot be treated adequately by the
current legal framework, we briefly explore the potential of the law of fiduciary
duties as a tool to rectify the situation. Our ultimate conclusion is that none of the
current legal tools are adequate for dealing with the issue.
I. INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY
In this section, we examine the jurisprudence concerning the liability of health
care institutions for medical error. As we mentioned in the introduction, there ap-
pear to have been few fundamental changes in the jurisprudence concerning institu-
tional liability for medical errors. As various commentators have noted, this situa-
tion is somewhat surprising, given the increasing role in health care delivery played
by health care institutions. As stated by Hardcastle: 
Hospitals and other institutions have responded to the complexity of modern
medicine by taking on a greater role in organizing and managing the deliv-
ery of services, and coordinating the diverse staff and programs. Organiza-
tion and management has extended to activities related to quality of care,
such as forming quality-control committees and creating policies relating to
patient outcomes . . .2
In addition, governments are also taking on additional responsibilities in the
health care space. According to Hardcastle, 
. . . as publically funded health care become entrenched in the Canadian
identity, government increased its involvement in the governance, manage-
ment and administration of the system. Motivated by its enormous public
investment in health care and growing public concern and expectations, the
state has developed an interested in issues such as quality of care and patient
outcomes. Governments now take on an active role in setting the overarch-
ing policies that guide the way the system operates and evolves.3
Examples of government activity in the operation and management of the
health care system include: (1) the development of policies relating to quality of
care; (2) the management of surgical scheduling (with concomitant wait time strate-
2 L. Hardcastle, “Government and Institutional Tort Liability for Quality of Care in Can-
ada” (2007) 15 Health Law J. 401 at 402.
3 Ibid.
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gies), and (3) the enactment of legislation pertaining to quality of care.4
Despite these developments, the common law jurisprudence has been faithful
to a framework in which physicians bear the burden of liability for many cases of
medical error, while institutions are characterized primarily as mere locations in
which physicians operate. As various commentators have noted, placing the pri-
mary responsibility for medical error on individual practitioners is a poor strategy,
given that many patient injuries are the result of systematic issues.5
In the following sections, we consider the case law on the liability of health
care institutions for medical errors. We first deal with direct duties, and then with
vicarious liability.6
(a) Direct Duties
As a thorough overview of the direct duties of institutions is beyond the scope
of this work, we restrict our attention to key themes. As noted by Hardcastle,7 Ca-
nadian law recognizes direct duties owed by hospitals to patients. The earliest du-
ties recognized in the law were to select competent staff and to provide proper
equipment and facilities. The courts gradually expanded these duties, as we shall
discuss below.
(i) Duty to Select Competent Staff
As mentioned above, this duty has long been recognized in Canadian law. The
recent case of Bateman v. Doiron8 appears in contemporary judgments as a concise
formulation of the duty. In that case, the court stated that: 
A hospital has an obligation to meet standards reasonably expected by the
community it serves in the provision of competent personnel and adequate
facilities and equipment and also with respect to the competence of physi-
cians to whom it grants privileges to provide medical treatment. It is not
responsible for negligence of physicians who practise in the hospital, but it
is responsible to ensure that doctors or staff are reasonably qualified to do
the work they might be expected to perform.9
4 Ibid at 418. We do not discuss government liability in this work, leaving the reader to
explore the presentation in Hardcastle’s paper.
5 As Hardcastle notes, “[t]he failure of the common law to evolve to reflect systemic
changes is particularly surprising, given the proliferation of literature demonstrating
that many patient injuries are attributable to systemic causes, and that institutions are in
a better position to recognize and rectify these problems” (ibid at 403). For a penetrat-
ing examination of medical error and tort law, see A. Merry & A. McCall, Errors,
Medicine and the Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Also see our
recent work, J. Williams & C. Kuziemsky, “Negligence and the Challenge of Collabo-
rative Care” (2011) Health Law J. (forthcoming).
6 Later in this work we deal with the issue of fiduciary obligations.
7 Supra note 2 at 421.
8 (1991), 8 C.C.L.T. (2d) 284 (N.B. Q.B.).
9 Ibid at 290. This decision was affirmed at appeal, in Bateman v. Doiron (1993), 141
N.B.R. (2d) 321, 18 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1 (C.A.).
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(ii) Duty to Establish Systems Pertaining to Safety or Quality of Care
A number of cases have held that a hospital has a duty to establish systems
that positively impact patient safety and quality of care. Considering safety, the
case of Granger (Litigation Guardian of) v. Ottawa General Hospital10 involved
an infant who experienced oxygen deprivation during delivery, incurring brain
damage as a result. Due to inexperience, the nurse in charge failed to report that the
fetal heart monitor showed deceleration of the infant’s heart rate. The plaintiffs
launched an action against the nurse, the nurse’s supervisor, all of the physicians
involved, and the hospital itself, (as a result of the fact that it was responsible for
hiring and overseeing the nurses). The court found the hospital liable, establishing a
precedent that a hospital may be responsible for the care given by its staff. In par-
ticular, the court founded liability upon the hospital’s responsibility to ensure “safe
systems”, adequate facilities and competent personnel.
Two years later, another case involving liability of hospitals considered the
duty to establish systems that relate to quality of care. In Wild v. Salvation Army
Maternity Hospital,11 one of the plaintiff’s claims was that the defendant hospital
failed to maintain “safe systems” in its provision of medical services. In setting out
their decision, the courts reaffirmed Bateman, and noted that the duty of care owed
by a hospital includes a duty to “establish systems necessary for the safe operation
of the hospital.”12 (In particular, the court noted that this duty to establish and fol-
low safe systems in providing medical services was accepted as a well-established
principle by the court in Granger).
The issue facing the court in Wild was to determine whether the Salvation
Army Maternity Hospital had in place (and followed) a system that could deal with
the contingencies that might foreseeably arise in an obstetrical unit. The plaintiff
had argued that the hospital: (a) failed to have in place adequate systems “to get the
right people to the right place at the right time”, and; (b) “showed an utter lack of
proper policymaking and a lack of implementation and/or enforcement of its ex-
isting policies.” The court was ultimately not persuaded that these claims had sub-
stance, noting that the plaintiffs had not presented significant evidence that the hos-
pital policies or their enforcement contributed to the error. The court gave weight to
an expert witness, who found that the hospital’s policies were comprehensive, in
conformity with national guidelines, and designed to support optimum client care.
In closing, the court in Wild made the following observations on medical mal-
practice: 
It is not reasonable as a society to expect certainty and perfection from med-
ical treatment. While the medical profession is moving gradually toward
that objective, its achievement is only a distant possibility. Those in the pro-
fession know too well the limitation of their science. We can only demand
of them a high standard of training and performance, and when they meet
those standards, accept that they cannot guarantee results and that unfortu-
nate, and sometimes inexplicable, outcomes will occur.
10 [1996] O.J. No. 2129 (Gen. Div.) [Granger].
11 (1998), 171 N.S.R. (2d) 201 (S.C.).
12 Here, the court cited E.I. Picard & G. Robertson, Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospi-
tals in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 367.
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Additional cases on this topic include Braun Estate v. Vaughan,13 where the
court found that a hospital had an affirmative duty to have policies for review test
results, and Vuchar v. Toronto General Hospital,14 which has established that hos-
pitals are liable for injury caused by inadequate or improperly maintained equip-
ment. As Hardcastle notes, “[the] affirmative duty to take proactive measures relat-
ing to patient safety is the closest Canadian courts have come to a duty to furnish a
patient with non-negligent medical care.”15
(iii) Duty to Ensure Proper Coordination
Although one could construe this as a special case of the duty to provide sys-
tems pertaining to safety or quality of care, the courts have also explicitly recog-
nized that hospitals have a duty to ensure that proper coordination occurs. For ex-
ample, in Lachambre v. Nair,16 the court stated that “[a] hospital which provides
the beds, the nurses, the equipment and the technicians cannot escape its responsi-
bilities to the patient by delegating the treatment or control of the procedures to
specialists who are independent contractors. The hospital may delegate the treat-
ment, but not the responsibility.” On the topic of coordination, Blair J stated that
“[w]here a patient in a hospital is treated by more than one specialty, the hospital
owes a duty to ensure that proper coordination occurs and that the treatment pro-
gram operates as a unified and cohesive whole.”
(iv) Duty to Ensure Provision of Competent Treatment
One of the most widely cited cases in this area is that of Yepremian v.
Scarborough General Hospital,17 which involved an internist who failed to diag-
nose and treat diabetes (resulting in severe harm to a patient). Noting that patients
expect to receive competent medical care at a hospital, the court posed a key ques-
tion — namely, does the hospital undertake to provide that medical care, or does it
merely undertake to select competent physicians who will provide it? Considering a
patient’s perspective, the court noted that patients expect that a hospital can provide
everything required to “make sure make sure, so far as is possible, that the patient’s
ailments are diagnosed and that proper treatment is carried out, whether this is done
by an employed doctor, a general practitioner or a specialist.”
The trial judge found the hospital liable, based on a breach of its duty to the
13 [2000] M.J. No. 63 (C.A.). At paragraph 48, the court made the following observation:
“It would have been a simple enough matter, for example, for the hospital to set its own
policy and procedures to see to it that a “safe system” was in place. Alternatively, the
hospital could simply have ascertained from physicians in the hospital clinic what kind
of follow-up protocols were required, and coordinate the procedures. There is ample
authority in a non-hospital, negligence context, to support the proposition that the ab-
sence of a reasonable policy to avoid or reduce a foreseeable risk can result in a finding
of negligence.”
14 [1937] O.R. 71, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 298 (C.A.) [Vuchar].
15 Supra note 2 at 421. See also footnote 90 on the same page for additional cases of this
type.
16 [1989] 2 W.W.R. 749 (Sask. Q.B.).
17 (1980), 28 O.R. (2d) 494 (C.A.) [Yepremian].
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patient. In particular, the trial judge stated that this duty is breached if there is a
failure by a specialist on the hospital’s staff to use reasonable skill and competence
in the treatment of a patient under his care. While the trial judge found the hospital
had an obligation to provide health care services to the public (based on the Public
Hospitals Act and common sense), the source of the duty mentioned above was
grounded on the hospital’s having the opportunity of controlling the quality of
medical service.
In considering these arguments, the Court of Appeal stated that unless there
exists in law a “non-delegable duty of care” owed by the hospital to the patient, the
hospital could not be liable for the medical error. In the words of Arnup J.A.: 
“No Court in Canada has ever found before that such a duty exists, and with
great respect to the trial Judge, I am not persuaded by his reasons that there
is such a duty. I am not dismissing those reasons perfunctorily, nor in-
tending to denigrate them, when I say that he seems to me to be saying, in
substance, “In all the circumstances, the hospital ought to be liable.” In my
view, if the criterion is to be what is fair and reasonable, it would be fair and
reasonable that the highly — skilled doctor whose negligence caused the
damage should be called upon to pay for it.
. . .
I agree with the trial Judge . . . that the Yepremians had every right to ex-
pect that a large public hospital like Scarborough General would provide
whatever was required to treat seriously ill or injured people, but I do not
think it follows that the public is entitled to add the further expectation:
“and if any doctor on the medical staff makes a negligent mistake, the hos-
pital will pay for it.”
Of the trial judge’s claim that the duty of care is grounded in the hospital’s
having the opportunity to control the quality of medical service, Arnup stated the
following: 
I do not know upon what evidence he bases this view, if it is intended to
reflect some ongoing supervision by the hospital of the quality of medical
service after a doctor is appointed to the medical staff. There is some evi-
dence that if a member of the medical staff appears to be neglecting his
patient, in the sense of not seeing the patient as often as expected, or at all, a
nurse may report this to the superintendent. . . . But a nurse, or a superinten-
dent for that matter, who suggested that some different medical treatment
from that being followed by a staff specialist might be preferable would be
going beyond any hospital practice established by the evidence . . .
The Government exercises a substantial degree of control over public hospi-
tals, through Regulations and especially through the hospitals’ finances. If
liability is to be imposed upon hospitals for the negligence of its medical
staff, including specialists, not employed by the hospitals, whether directly
or by imposing a statutory duty to provide such services, it should be the
function of the Legislature, as a policy question, to decide whether and
under what conditions such liability is to attach.
Speaking in dissent, Houlden J.A. enunciated an argument for holding the hos-
pital liable: 
The provision of a wide range of medical services is thus an integral and
essential part of the operation of a modern, general hospital. This is so re-
gardless of the way in which the hospital has structured its relationship with
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the professional personnel who provide those services. While the negligent
act may be committed by a particular individual, that act is part of the over-
all medical care provided by the hospital. It is medical care that is sought by
the patient; and it is proper medical care that should be provided. The pri-
mary responsibility for the provision of this medical care is, in my opinion,
that of the hospital, and the hospital cannot delegate that responsibility to
others so as to relieve itself of liability.
As explained by Hardcastle,18 most courts have followed the majority decision
in Yepremian. As a result, it is safe to say that the common law does not unreserv-
edly embrace a non-delegable duty of care from the hospital to its patients.
(b) Vicarious Liability
The other avenue by which courts may impose liability on health care institu-
tions in tort concerns vicarious liability — the doctrine by which an employer is
liable for the tortious conduct of its employees. In order for a claim of vicarious
liability to succeed, the conduct must have been undertaken within the scope of the
employment relation. If the actions incurring the loss were performed by contrac-
tors or volunteers, the employer cannot be held vicariously liable.19 In addition, the
courts have imposed limits on an employer’s liability, by requiring that an em-
ployer be in a position to exercise control over the manner in which the employee
performs her work.20
Commenting on vicarious liability in the health care space, Picard and Robert-
son note that: 
Whether a hospital will be vicariously liable for the negligence of a doctor
depends upon the relationship among the hospital, the doctor and the pa-
tient. In the great majority of cases, patients engage and pay their doctor
(usually through medicare plans) and have the power to dismiss them. The
hospital does not employ the physicians nor are they carrying out any of the
hospital’s duties to the patient. They are granted the privilege of using per-
sonnel, facilities and equipment provided by the hospital but this alone does
not make them employees. They are independent contractors who are di-
rectly liable to their patients, and the hospital is not vicariously liable for
their negligence.21
According to Hardcastle, institutions are vicariously liable for the majority of
health care professionals, including nurses, residents, and medical imaging techni-
18 Supra note 2 at 423. On page 438, the same author notes that there is one pending case
that could lead to reconsideration of hospital liability; due to the lack of activity on the
case, she suspects that the parties may have settled.
19 For a classical formulation of this rule (in terms of masters and servants), see for
instance, Battistoni v. Thomas, [1932] S.C.R. 144.
20 See, for instance, Lake v. Callison Outfitters Ltd. (1991), 7 C.C.L.T. (2d) 274 (B.C.
S.C.). For a more extensive set of references on vicarious liability, see A.M. Linden &
L.N. Klar, Canadian Tort Law: Cases, Notes and Materials, 11th ed. (Toronto: But-
terworths, 1999) at 519.
21 Supra note 12 at 381.
284   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [9 C.J.L.T.]
cians.22 In her words, Canadian courts considering institutional liability tend to fo-
cus on factors of remuneration and control, providing little analysis for their cate-
gorization of doctors as independent contractors.23 As a matter of fact, health care
institutions exercise more control over physicians than in the past, as they typically
constrain the conduct of doctors by means of policies and procedures.24
(c) Summary
This section has briefly outlined the main sources of liability for medical error,
as it pertains to health care institutions (rather than individual practitioners). In the
next section, we introduce some of the fundamentals of healthcare ICT. We will
ultimately argue that these technologies have invalidated some of the assumptions
made in the case law outlined above. In particular, these technologies have subtle
(yet profound) impacts on health care practitioners; since these systems are de-
signed, implemented and maintained at the organizational level, health care institu-
tions: (a) are causally responsible for corresponding systems-level errors, and; (b)
have the ability to alter the way in which health care professionals fulfill their
responsibilities.
II. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IN
HEALTH
(a) Overview
Our healthcare system is evolving from care that is provided by a single pro-
vider and setting to care that is provided across multiple providers and settings.
Reports such as the 2001 Institute of Medicine Study have stated that information
and communication technologies (ICT) will be a key driver of this new healthcare
system.25 In response to the call for the re-shaping of healthcare systems, many
countries have been investing massive amounts of funding and resources to develop
ICT infrastructures to support interoperable healthcare delivery. For instance, the
government of Canada formed a new public agency (Canada Health Infoway) that
has been tasked with the development of a national, integrated electronic health
record (EHR) system.26 Australia has a national e-Health strategy for electronically
collecting and exchanging health information,27 while the United Kingdom has the
Connecting for Health strategy to deliver delivering a national program for health-
22 Supra note 2 at 423.
23 Ibid at 424.
24 Furthermore, the courts have recognized that physicians are bound to follow these poli-
cies. Hardcastle cites the case of MacPhail v. Desrosiers, [1998] N.S.J. No. 353 (C.A.).
25 Institute of Medicine, “Crossing the Quality Chasm: a New Health System for the
Twenty-first Century” (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2001).
26 See the Canada Health Infoway website, online: <http://www.infoway-in-
foroute.ca/lang-en/>.
27 E.J.S. Hovenga, “The Importance of Achieving Semantic Interoperability for National
Health Information Systems” (2008) 17:1 Texto Contexto Enferm 158.
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care IT.28 In 2009 the United States Congress allocated more than $20 billion for
health information technology.
Many of these projects involve “top down” approaches to ICT deployment,
where national or regional bodies develop standards, reference architectures and
other artefacts that impose constraints of the ICT solutions deployed in their juris-
diction. Critics have questioned the utility of “top down” models; for instance, the
Canadian approach has been characterized as a “Soviet” style approach that is un-
likely to yield benefits.29 In contrast, the United States has taken a different direc-
tion, in that they are starting at the individual provider level where they are con-
necting multiple provider systems into a health information exchange.30 The
panoply of information exchanges will then be scaled up to form a national health
information system.31
Despite the increased use of ICT in healthcare the evaluation of these technol-
ogies on remains mixed. In September 2011 the United Kingdom announced it was
dismantling their healthcare IT program after a cost of 12.7 Billion pounds. High
failure rates in Healthcare ICT projects are common.32 Even more significant is
that the implementation of ICT in healthcare are frequently met with user, organi-
zational and clinical issues.33 One major concern is that these systems often change
how healthcare providers and administrators do their jobs. As will be discussed
below, these changes can have adverse effects on care delivery.
(b) Types of ICT
Before we engage in a discussion about the effects of ICT on health care de-
livery, we pause briefly to review some of most important types of systems in use
today.
(i) Patient Management Software
One of the most common types of ICT in the health care domain consists of
patient management software.34 Scheduling and billing applications (SBAs) pro-
vide a core set of functionality supporting the financial and logistical workflows of
28 Connecting for Health, online: <http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/>.
29 Paul Christopher Webster & Wayne Kondro, “Medical data debates: Big is better?
Small is beautiful?” (2011) 109:1 CMAJ 3799.
30 W.A. Yasnoff et al, “A consensus action agenda for achieving the National Health
Information infrastructure” (2004) 11:4 J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc. 332.
31 E. Coiera, “Building a national health IT system from the middle out” (2009) 16:3 J.
Am. Med. Inform. Assoc. 271.
32 R. Heeks, “Health information systems: Failure, success and improvisation” (2006) 75
Int. J. Med. Inform. 125.
33 B. Kaplan & K.D. Harris-Salamone, “Health IT Success and Failure: Recommenda-
tions from Literature and an AMIA Workshop” (2009) 16:4 J. Am. Med. Inform. As-
soc. 291.
34 For a more comprehensive overview of patient management software, see J. Williams
& J. Weber, “Regulation of Patient Management Software” (2010) 17:8 Health Law J.
73.
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a health care delivery location, including: (a) tracking patient contact information,
and; (b) scheduling appointments. Electronic medical records (EMR) systems ex-
tend the functionality of SBAs by allowing health care providers to manage health
information for use in clinical care. EMRs are designed to store a wide variety of
personal health information (PHI), including care plans and test results; it is also
common for them to provide support for automated alerts, diagnostic aids, and
case-specific best practice guidelines. Lastly, an electronic health record (EHR)
system is a “multi-tenant” EMR that focuses on providing shared access to multi-
ple health care providers. EMRs typically have more depth and are often single site,
but they feed into the broader EHR to enable cross site data sharing. Records in an
EHR are intended to be comprehensive, life-long and accessible across a variety of
care settings.35
(ii) Decision Support Systems
Decision support systems (DSS) have been (broadly) defined as “any program
designed to help health-care professionals make clinical decisions.”36 Specific cate-
gories of DSS include: (1) systems for information management; (2) systems for
focusing attention, and; (3) systems for providing patient-specific suggestions. We
describe some of the tasks to which DSS can be applied in the paragraphs below:37
Alerts and reminders:
DSS can be used to send reminders to caregivers concerning a patient’s
need for medication or diagnostic tests. For critical care, DSS can be used to
monitor sensors (e.g., pulse oximeters), issuing alerts when thresholds are
reached.38
Diagnostic assistance:
DSS can aid clinicians in drawing inferences about the patient’s condition.
Where a human expert may miss rare conditions, a DSS can present a com-
prehensive range of hypotheses.39
35 N.P. Terry & L.P. Francis, “Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic
Health Records” (2007) U. Ill. L. Rev. 681.
36 M. Musen, Y. Shahar & E. Shortliffe, “Clinical decision support systems” in: E. Shor-
tliffe et al, eds., Medical Informatics. Computer Applications in Health Care and Bi-
omedicine, 2d (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2001) at 573.
37 For an introduction to decision support, see E. Coiera, Guide to Health Informatics, 2d
(London: Arnold, 2003) at 330.
38 As we discuss below, studies have shown that alerts or reminders ate frequently dis-
abled or overridden by providers. H. Van der Sijs et al, “Overriding of drug safety
alerts in computerized physician order entry” (2006) 13:2 J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc.
138.
39 Of particular interest for our purposes are knowledge-based systems (also known as
expert systems). These DSS provide representation and reasoning functionality; their
databases contain formalized rules that represent clinical knowledge, typically focusing
on one clinical task (e.g., diagnosing skin ailments). Clinicians can enter data about
individual patients, and query the system for advice.
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Therapy critiquing and planning:
DSS are often used to examine treatment plans for inconsistencies, errors
and omissions. More advanced artefacts (planning systems) can even use a
database of treatment protocols to construct a care plan for a patient.
Prescribing medications:
DSS are often used to provide advice for clinicians who are prescribing
medications, supplying them with information on interactions, dosage errors
and contraindications.
Image recognition and interpretation:
DSS are frequently used for interpreting images (e.g., MRI scans); com-
puters can process hundreds of images in batch mode, flagging worrisome
cases for human inspection.
(iii) Protocol Systems
ICT-based protocol systems augment the capabilities of clinicians by provid-
ing support for the use of clinical practice guidelines (CPGs), or care maps. These
systems are intended to facilitate evidence based medicine by guiding the user
through a set of primitives that represent steps in a clinical encounter.40 Passive
protocol systems are sources of information that clinicians can access during care.
In contrast, active protocol systems constrain the actions of clinicians, as opposed
to merely providing information. To take but a single example, they might force a
clinician to enter information into an EMR in a particular sequence; alternatively,
they might provide partial automation of this data entry.
(iv) Medical Devices
Although some medical devices (e.g., cardiac stents, surgical tubing) are un-
powered, many modern offerings contain sophisticated electronics, including com-
puter processors and software.41 In addition, many medical devices are now being
designed with interfaces that allow them to exchange data with: (a) other medical
devices, and; (b) software systems, such as EMRs. This data can be used for care
planning (e.g., glucose monitors that send data to a centralized repository for re-
view by a nurse), decision support and other clinical/administrative functions.
(v) Other Systems
There are at least two additional categories of ICT that are associated with
40 These primitives can include: (1) action steps, clinical tasks to be performed or
avoided; (2) decision steps, selections from a set of alternatives, and; (3) patient states,
descriptions of the clinical status of a patient. See D. Wang et al, “Representation prim-
itives, process models and patient data in computer-interpretable clinical practice
guidelines: a literature review of guideline representation models” (2002) 68 Int. J.
Med. Inform. 59.
41 Drug pumps and glucose monitors are but two examples of medical devices that are
now designed with either onboard computing power or downloadable memories. For a
review of electronic medical devices, see J.B. Weitzman, “Electronic Medical Devices:
A Primer for Pathologists” (2003) 127 Arch. Pathol. Lab. Med. 814.
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medical error. First, collaborative/communication systems are intended to facilitate
team work between health care practitioners. Second, computerized physician order
entry (CPOE) systems are meant to automate a particular task (i.e. patient medica-
tion order) in order to improve efficiency.
III. IMPACTS OF HEALTHCARE ICT
In this section, we examine the impacts of ICT on health care practitioners.
We begin by reviewing some of the basic concepts on systems-level medical errors.
After that, we discuss the various impacts associated with the use of ICT in the
health care domain.
(a) Medical Errors
A recent study in Canada found that adverse events occurred frequently, with
an observed rate of 7.5% of hospital admissions.42 Merry and McCall’s work43 on
medical error and the law highlights the ease with which society is ready to blame
individuals (e.g., physicians) for errors that may be systematic in nature. In fact,
Rosenthal and Sutcliffe44 have argued that 85% of errors are the result of systems-
issues. In their work, they grouped systemic causes for errors into two high level
categories: (1) organizational factors, and; (2) institutional factors. The various
types of organizational factors include team factors, work environment, organiza-
tional design, culture and leadership. Institutional factors include regulatory con-
texts, health care standards and the complexity of care delivery. Rosenthal and Sut-
cliffe point out that errors that result from systems concerns are more likely to be
serious than those that arise from the actions of individual care providers. In their
words, “the higher an error is when it occurs, the more likely it is to be dissemi-
nated through amplifying power of the organization.”
(b) The Impact of ICT on Care Delivery
While the introduction of ICT into health care can result in tremendous im-
provements, it can also introduce new risks. In particular, information technology
clearly has the potential for causing medical errors.45 Ash et al report that despite
the potential of healthcare ICT to reduce errors (through the use of alerts, drug
interaction checking and other means), many applications seemed to foster errors
rather than reduce their likelihood.46 In the words of the authors, “[i]n health care
42 G.R. Baker et al, “The Canadian Adverse Events Study: the incidence of adverse
events among hospital patients in Canada” (2004) 170 CMAJ 1678 (cited in Hardcas-
tle, supra note 2).
43 A. Merry & A. McCall, supra note 5.
44 M. Rosenthal & K. Sutcliffe, Medical Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do?
(San Francisco: John Wiley and Sons, 2002) (cited in Hardcastle, supra note 2).
45 See, for instance, R. Anderson, “Do Summary Care Records Have the Potential to do
More Harm than Good? Yes” (2010) 340 Brit. Med. J. 1390.
46 J.S. Ash, M. Berg & E. Coiera, “Some Unintended Consequences of Information Tech-
nology in Health Care: the Nature of Patient Care Information System-related Errors”
(2004) 11:2 J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc. 104 at 105.
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practices in the United States, Europe, and Australia alike, we have seen situations
in which the system of people, technologies, organizational routines, and regula-
tions that constitutes any health care practice seemed to be weakened rather than
strengthened by the introduction of the [patient care information system] applica-
tion. In other words, we frequently observed instances in which the intended
strengthening of one link in the chain of care actually leads unwittingly to a dele-
tion or weakening of others.”47 At a minimum, we should be aware that ICT initia-
tives can have drastic (and unanticipated) impacts on the provision of care
delivery.48
One of the unpredictable aspects of deploying ICT systems is the degree to
which the technology can actually influence the people who use it. As opposed to
being a mere facilitator, ICT influences the way in which health care practitioners
understand evidence, exercise judgment, engage in reasoning and execute work
processes. As stated by Niazkhania et al,49 the implementation of health informa-
tion technology systems is a “process of mutual transformation in which the organi-
zation and the system transform each other.” Although perhaps novel to legal pro-
fessionals, the unpredictable dynamics of large scale ICT systems have been
documented for years in the systems engineering, software engineering and health
informatics literature. In the sections to follow, we describe some of the major risks
pertaining to ICT.
(i) Errors in Software and Hardware Artefacts
As with any artefact, software and hardware can contain latent defects; these
can arise through errors in the design process (e.g., logical errors in the design of
circuits), or through errors in the manufacturing or fabrication process (e.g., physi-
cal flaws in circuit boards). Disruptions of this sort can have system-wide conse-
quences, as in the case of a failure in a communications network that connects
multiple care settings.50
(ii) Failures in Implementation and Operation
The introduction of ICT changes the way that health care organizations work
with data. There are two types of risks here. First, there are risks associated with
switching over from a “legacy” information management system. Second, there are
ongoing risks of system failure during day-to-day operation. Both types of risk
have caused serious injury, hospital-wide breakdown, and even death.
47 Ibid at 104.
48 As stated by Ash et al, ibid at 104, “[w]hen such technologies become an integral part
of health care work practices, we are confronted with a large sociotechnical system in
which many behaviors emerge out of the sociotechnical coupling, and the behavior of
the overall system in any new situation can never be fully predicted from the individual
social or technical components.”
49 Niazkhania et al, “Evaluating the medication process in the context of CPOE use: The
significance of working around the system” (2011) 80 Int. J. Med. Inform. 490.
50 Methodologies and practices exist to deal with many of the defects encountered in
practice. This type of error is not our concern at present, and we shall have little to say
about it in the remainder of the paper.
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(iii) Errors in Designing ICT for a Health Care Environment
One of the most important categories of ICT-based error concerns the poten-
tial mismatch between the design of a system and the operational demands of the
health care environment in which it is deployed. As noted by Ash et al,51 these
errors are not easily found by a technical analysis of the design, or even suspected
after the first encounter with the system in use. Instead, they only emerge when the
technical system is embedded into a working organization. Although the errors can
vary from one organization to another, some common features of health care can
(and should) be anticipated by the organizations who put these systems into
operation.
(A) Unanticipated Uses
Even the most perfectly engineered software may give rise to error through a
mechanism that is often overlooked by designers — namely, the humans who use
it. A case in point is the Therac-25 radiation therapy machine, whose software
caused patients to receive massive radiation overdoses.52 Some fatal accidents in-
volving Therac-25 happened when human operators became faster and more profi-
cient with entering data. Since the software was not designed or tested with opera-
tors with this level of skill, the use of the machine was effectively being pushed
passed the boundaries envisioned during design and implementation.
(B) Errors in the Process of Entering and Retrieving Information
One of two fundamental categories of ICT error identified by Ash et al,53 this
category of error concerns the special demands involved in providing clinicians
with information. Health care users face constraints that are not common in other
workplaces, such as case management, legal or accounting work. First, health care
ICT generally has to offer fast response times and minimal downtime. Second,
many health care ICT systems have to be deployed in a form suitable for dynamic
environments; for instance, instead of static desktop machines, many computer sys-
tems have to be on mobile carts that can be wheeled from ward to ward. Third, the
user interfaces must be clean, elegant and readily understandable by users whose
primary task is dealing with patients (and often many at once), rather than with
computers.
One major problem with ICT is that the user interfaces may be unsuitable in a
variety of ways. To take a simple example, many user interfaces assume that the
user is engaged in only one task; in health care environments, most clinicians are
constantly navigating a complex flow of tasks, with patients and other professionals
competing for their time at any given moment. Issues associated with human data
entry in healthcare ICT include juxtaposition hazards, in which a poorly designed
51 Supra note 46 at 105.
52 A detailed analysis of Therac-25 has been published in N.G. Leveson & C.S. Turner,
“An Investigation of the Therac-25 Accidents” (1993) 26:7 IEEE Computer 18.
53 Supra note 46 at 106.
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interface results in many clinicians selecting the wrong option due to misleading
cues.
Another example of user interface errors involve cognitive overload. First,
there are issues that arise when ICT imposes too much structure on clinicians.
Health care professionals need to communicate information rapidly and accurately,
preferring unstructured text (e.g., notes in a paper chart) for communicating infor-
mation. When ICT forces clinicians to enter data in structured format, it can inter-
fere with the clinician’s ability to devote herself fully to the clinical task at hand.
This is an example of an interruption hazard, in which errors are caused by inter-
rupting the clinician’s workflow or “train of thought.” Even worse, some ICT may
prevent clinicians from fully thinking through problems in the first place. An im-
portant (and perhaps surprising) point is that the act of writing down clinical infor-
mation is actually a form of thinking; this “writing-as-thinking” phenomenon has
been documented in several case studies, which jointly indicate that interrupting
this process is actually detrimental to the cognitive processes involved in providing
care.54 Since some ICT forces users to enter information in highly structured for-
mats, it creates a risk of disruption and cognitive disturbance that may ultimately
degrade the quality of care and result in adverse events for patients.
An example of altered cognition is the change from a manual to an automated
process. One of the authors of this paper is currently conducting a study of a peri-
operative system that automatically retrieves patient data such as blood pressure
and respiratory rate. Whereas in the past the anaesthetist would have had to manu-
ally record the patient data, in the new system vital signs will be pulled automati-
cally from patient monitoring devices. One of the anaesthetists in the study worries
that clinicians could pay less attention to the numbers because they no longer have
the manual recording step. The “check in” assessment of the patient’s vital signs is
a process that is driven by the current manual system. That is an example of how
manual tasks can be altered by technology.55
A second issue is that user interfaces may overload a clinician, requiring so
much effort to navigate (and presenting such a fragmented view of the information)
that they lose their ability to gain an overview of the case. As stated by Ash et al,
“records might overly separate the information flows according to work task or
responsibility. In everyday practice, doctors can gather information from nurses’
notes, or those of other specialists, that relate to the problem. Information systems
could limit this easy access to other people’s notes or other parts of the record, and
thereby severely hamper the professional’s ability to be optimally informed.”56
A third issue is that the completeness offered by healthcare ICT (particularly
EMR and EHR systems) can cause difficulties for practitioners. The inclusion of
standard phrases and comprehensive views of patient histories embedded in reports
54 See for example M. Berg, “Practices of reading and writing: the constitutive role of the
patient record in medical work” (1996) 18 Sociology of Health & Illness 499.
55 Other domains have described similar issues with excess computerization. Specifically
the aviation industry has shown that excess computerization may dull a pilot’s skills
and impact his ability to perform certain procedures manually. See for instance:
<http://www.cnn.com/2011/TRAVEL/09/01/airlines.autopilot/index.html>.
56 Supra note 46 at 107.
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forces clinicians to search for meaningful content. For instance, a clinician may not
know whether an observation was merely selected from a template, automatically
generated by an expert system, or was carefully and thoughtfully recorded by an-
other clinician, who considered it integral to the case. The tendency to “cut and
paste” is a problem in any workplace that relies on templates and standardized
formats.
(C) Errors in the Communication and Coordination Process
The second major category introduced by Ash et al, these errors concern the
way computers can undermine communication about (and coordination of) events
and activities. As stated by Ash, “[h]ealth care work can be characterized as the
managing of patients’ trajectories; under continuous time pressure, and in constant
interaction with colleagues and the patient, health care professionals have to try to
keep a patient’s problem on track. This implies simultaneously acting on a whole
range of dimensions, including interpreting physical signs and diagnostic tests, and
dealing with organizational policies and the patient’s individual needs.”57
While computers excel at routine, monotonous and standardized work, ICT
that is not designed for the complex, non-routine and dynamic nature of health care
is likely to interfere with the task of health care delivery. One of the major
problems in health informatics is that ICT is typically designed for linear work-
flows, while health care is inherently non-linear and dynamic.58 The inflexibility
offered by these systems can become a major constraint for clinicians, who are
forced to adhere to steps in a linear workflow that may be irrelevant, unnecessary
or even completely erroneous in the circumstances of the case at hand. To deal with
this, clinicians will often invent workarounds, defined by Niazkhania et al as “in-
formal rules or work methods — not formally considered and outlined in the sys-
tem design — employed in working with a system to handle a workflow prob-
lem.”59 Unfortunately, workarounds can be unreliable and unstable;60 they can also
increase the cognitive burden on clinicians to the detriment of care.61
Another type of error introduced by ICT arises from potential losses of com-
munication. Simply put, the act of entering data into a computer is not the same as
that involved in talking to colleague. Sometimes the synchronous communication
involved in picking up the phone and calling a clinician (e.g., to alert them about
the availability of diagnostic test results) is highly useful, and assumed by clinical
practice. The use of ICT can disrupt traditional patterns of communications by frus-
57 Supra note 46 at 105.
58 Supra note 46 at 107.
59 Supra note 49 at 491.
60 M. Kobayashi et al, “Work coordination, work flow, and workarounds in a medical
context” in Human Factors in Computing Systems (New York: Association for Com-
puting Machinery, 2005) at 1561.
61 Studies have shown that ICTs such as CPOEs can be a significant cause of medical
errors and workarounds. See for example R. Koppel et al, “The role of computerized
physician order entry systems in facilitating medication errors” (2005) 293:10 JAMA
1197.
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trating these expectations. For example, problems arise when a person sending a
message trusts that a technological solution at the other end (e.g., fax machine,
printer, EMR system) will take care of notifying the receiver. This creates a distinc-
tion between a request or order that has been communicated, and one that has been
executed. In the words of Ash et al: 
As a result of miscommunication, orders or appointments are missed, diag-
nostic tests are delayed, and medication is not given. Communication in-
volves more than transferring information. Communication is about generat-
ing effect — the laboratory personnel wanted to make sure that the doctors
would act on their data. Similarly, communication is about testing out as-
sumptions regarding the other person’s understanding of the situation and
willingness to act on your information. In addition, communication is al-
ways also about establishing, testing, or maintaining relationships.62
Errors can also result from decision support systems (DSS), through the phe-
nomenon of overload. In practice, DSS systems can bombard clinicians with alerts
and warnings, leading to alert fatigue, in which errors occur due to the software
desensitizing users. Clinicians may disregard warnings deliberately, or sometimes
even go to the trouble of turning the warning system off. Although this behaviour
may seem negligent, the scarcity of time at the disposal of clinicians means that
they are sometimes making a rational decision in decreasing the amount of inter-
ruptions caused by DSS systems, albeit at the risk of missing the rare alert that
could save a patient from an adverse event.
Lastly, when ICT systems disrupt traditional patterns of communication, they
can disrupt the natural checks and balances inherent in traditional processes. For
instance, Ash et al use the example of prescriptions, wherein pharmacists often
catch mistakes in prescriptions that have been caused by physicians.63 Although
prescription errors are very common, medication errors (i.e., the patient consuming
the wrong medication) are much lower. This distributed workflow, while not per-
fect, has some constraints operating against errors by prescribing physicians. If re-
placed by a CPOE system, these traditional advantages could be eliminated — (in
some cases, for the worse). While there is much room for improvement in health
care, it would be hubris to suggest that the various and sundry workflows devel-
oped by health care practitioners have no merits in terms of patient safety or effec-
tive communication.
(iv) Errors in Standards
In order for information to be communicated from one health care setting to
another, a number of conditions must be satisfied. Not only must the health infor-
mation system at the receiving location be able to receive and understand the data,
but the clinicians at that location must be able to understand and use it. To this end,
the health informatics community has developed numerous standards for in-
terchange of health information, including messaging standards, and coding stan-
dards. To take a recent example, the “Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine —
Clinical Terms” (SNOMED-CT) is a collection of medical terms that cover clinical
62 Supra note 46 at 109.
63 Supra note 46 at 110.
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areas such as diseases, procedures, drugs and pathogens. In the absence of such a
standardized terminology, practitioners are left to their own devices to enter de-
scriptions for these and other aspects of clinical care.64
While semantic interoperability standards are intended to resolve confusion
and ambiguity, they are themselves the result of collaborative efforts by health care
organizations, and hence subject to error.65 Errors in terminologies or data inter-
operability standards can result in harm to a patient, even though the local health
care professionals and organizations involved in providing care conducted them-
selves in an optimal (even flawless) manner. In general, health care practitioners
who rely on standardized terminologies have little chance of detecting such
problems.
(v) Integration of Errors
Although the above errors are described individually, in actually practice an
individual error can lead to systematic errors. Earlier we described how healthcare
delivery is moving towards care provided across multiple providers and settings.
Collaboration can make individual errors have a more profound impact as they can
ripple to become systematic errors that impact several providers. For example, al-
though errors due to altered cognition or information retrieval take place at the
level of an individual clinician, the impact of these errors will resonate when an
error laden decision (or error laden information) is communicated to team mem-
bers. Collaborative care delivery, although beneficial to patients, also has the abil-
ity to accentuate the impact of errors by giving them a dissemination channel.
IV. TOWARD GREATER INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY
In previous sections we have: (1) outlined key principles of institutional liabil-
ity for medical error; (2) provided an overview of healthcare ICT, and; (3) dis-
cussed the types of error that health information systems can cause. Of course, most
legal professionals are aware that deploying ICT in the health care domain can in-
duce system-level errors, such as malfunctions of communications channels serving
disparate care locations. The novel content in our presentation concerns the ability
of ICT to affect the behaviour of health care professionals themselves. As we saw,
ICT can interfere with users in various ways, such as impairing their ability to com-
prehend information, multitask, communicate with colleagues, exercise judgment
and follow optimal workflows. ICT can also be disruptive on a macro-level, dis-
lodging the safeguards built up in traditional methods of care delivery.
In the following sections, we explore the liability of institutions for certain
classes of medical error. As we stated above, the deployment of ICT in health care
not only carries risks, but has a profound influence on individual health care practi-
tioners. Since the design and deployment of ICT is an organizational or govern-
64 For instance, the terms “myocardial infraction” and “heart attack” may be synonymous
to physicians, but an expert system may not be programmed to reflect this.
65 A recent paper identified a high percentage of cases in which SNOWMED-CT terms
with a similar word structure had dissimilar logical modeling. See A. Agrawal, G.
Elhanan & M. Halper, “Dissimilarities in the Logical Modeling of Apparently Similar
Concepts in SNOMED CT” (2010) AMIA Annu. Symp. Proc. 2010 at 212.
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mental responsibility, policy considerations (and common sense) dictate that insti-
tutions should be held responsible for related errors. The sections below examine
this claim in more detail.
(a) Updating the Model of Care Delivery
First, it is clear that the traditional model of care delivery is completely out-
dated. The traditional framework, (in which a hospital is a mere staging ground for
the performances of contractor physicians), is archaic. Currently, health care is de-
livered by individuals drawn from a dizzying array of professional disciplines,
working in dynamic and unstructured care teams, acting across geographical dis-
tances, with the help of administrative and technical support offered by multiple
health care organizations. In many cases, the technical infrastructure includes com-
plex ICT systems that are implemented and maintained by institutions, and often
funded by governments. International standards bodies and public agencies (e.g.,
Canada Health Infoway) inform the design of these systems by setting architectural
and semantic interoperability standards. Not only are clinicians (including doctors)
subject to bylaws, codes of conduct, statutes and common law obligations, but ICT
systems themselves have a profound and subtle impact on their ability to provide
care.
On the whole, this is a dramatic change from the simple “physician occupying
a hospital room” model of yesteryear. Not only is the role of the doctor diminished,
but the myriad systems, collaborations and activities involved mean that systems-
level concerns are exceedingly important. This fact has been recognized in the liter-
ature at times, as in the Winnipeg Inquiry, which stated that: 
While some of the problems that the program faced related to the abilities
and conduct of specific individuals, other problems were largely systemic in
nature . . .
[It is] unrealistic to believe that human error can be totally eliminated. More
importantly, it is impossible to design a system that relies totally on every-
one doing the tasks assigned to them properly. Allowances must be made
for the possibility that errors will be committed and mechanisms to address
that possibility must be put into place.66
As a result, any mechanism that attempts to address the errors involved in
modern care delivery must have the ability to impact the actors responsible for im-
plementing and maintaining systems. Healthcare is set to become more complex in
the years ahead, not less.
(b) Impacts of ICT on Clinicians
Reviewing our discussion of errors and ICT in the previous section, we saw
that there are a number of ways in which information technology can drastically
alter the way in which clinicians perform their duties. Implementing ICT is a pro-
66 Associate Chief Justice Murray Sinclair, The Report of the Manitoba Pediatric Cardiac
Surgery Inquest: An Inquiry into Twelve Deaths at the Winnipeg Health Sciences Cen-
tre in 1994, (Winnipeg, Provincial Court of Manitoba: 2000) at 465 and 487 (cited in
Hardcastle, supra note 2 at 409).
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cess of “mutual transformation”, as opposed to merely handing a tool to clinicians.
Among other implications, mutuality means that: (1) a system may be used in ways
that its designers did not expect, and; (2) users may be impacted or impaired by its
presence. Among the errors we have seen are:
• Unanticipated uses, where users violate the assumptions made during the
design of the product.
• User interface issues, which yield juxtaposition hazards, cognitive over-
load, and interruption hazards. This class of problems can also disrupt a
clinician’s ability to reason and exercise judgment, as well as their ability
to come to a comprehensive picture of a case (fragmentation).
• Completeness issues, whereby standard phrases and a wealth of detail
make it difficult for clinicians to communicate the key aspects of the
case. This entails a search cost on the part of a receiving clinician, in
order to find information of value. (In contrast, paper notes are usually
written in a manner that affords easy access to this material).
• Workflow issues, where ICT either forces clinicians to follow a linear
(and inappropriate) workflow, or to abandon traditional workflows that
suit the care setting in which they operate. This leads to workarounds,
which can be a major source of error.
• Losses of communication, in which systems are relied upon for communi-
cating task requests. The difference between communication and execu-
tion means that senders cannot ensure that receivers have actually
processed a request. The human aspects of communication are elided, to
the detriment of care.
• Overload, in which clinicians are bombarded by messages from decision
support systems. This can lead to alert fatigue; in other cases, the clini-
cian will ignore or disable the warnings.
• Disrupting traditional processes, where some of the checks and balances
inherent in traditional approaches to care are removed.
• Errors in standards, which are difficult (if not impossible) for clinicians
to detect. If errors in semantic interoperability standards arise, clinicians
can no longer trust that the information that they receive about a patient’s
status means the same thing to them as it does to the clinician who was
responsible for recording the information.
In short, the impact of ICT in a health care setting goes well beyond the pre-
dictable hardware and software failures studied in software and hardware engineer-
ing. ICT can have a profound impact on the way clinicians observe, communicate,
reason, exercise judgment and execute tasks. At a high level, the systems with
which a clinician interacts can act in several modalities. First, they act as enablers,
allowing clinicians to perform a vast array of functions that are novel and useful.
Second, they constrain clinicians in several key respects, including their ability to
communicate, cogitate, and follow traditional workflows. Third, ICT can actually
change the way clinicians observe and exercise judgment. Decision support sys-
tems, for instance, can suggest novel possibilities, while diagnostic aids or medical
devices can actually furnish epistemological primitives by which clinicians form a
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view of a case. In a sense, a clinician dealing with ICT begins to think in a fashion
that mimics the design choices built into the technology (assuming she does not
invent workarounds for every function).
In this respect, the impact of ICT on clinicians (and hence care delivery) is
more profound than that of policies and procedures. The psychological effects of
ICT are significant, capable of penetrating into basic cognitive processes such as
reasoning and perception. Additionally, policies and procedures are typically
drafted by health care practitioners, whereas ICT is often designed in isolation from
clinicians, and then transplanted into an environment that could prove to be a
mismatch.
(c) Evaluating the Current Approach to Institutional Liability
In this section, we assess the existing jurisprudence in terms of its adequacy
for addressing the issue of ICT-related medical error. We begin with direct duties,
followed by a consideration of vicarious liability.
(i) Is the Law of Direct Duties Sufficient?
In terms of direct duties, we saw that the courts have recognized several dif-
ferent species, including: (1) a duty to select competent staff, including physicians;
(2) a duty to establish systems that positively impact patient safety and quality of
care;67 (3) a duty to utilize adequate equipment, and;68 (4) a duty to ensure that
proper coordination occurs, and that care programs operate as a “unified and cohe-
sive whole.” We also saw (via Yepremian) that the courts have not embraced a non-
delegable general duty of care between a hospital and its patients.
The least promising direct duty concerns the obligation of the hospital to hire
competent staff. None of the errors we outlined above depended on failings of indi-
vidual skill, and some (such as cognitive impairment and overloading) would affect
even the best practitioners. If interpreted broadly, the duty to provide adequate
equipment could cover errors arising from poor user interface design. However, it
could not cover the remainder of the issues; for instance, unanticipated uses are by
definition unforeseeable by systems designers and health care administrators.69 The
duty to ensure that proper coordination occurs (and that care programs operate as a
“unified and cohesive whole”) might cover the “losses of communication” issues
we described above. The most promising duty consists of the obligation to put in
place “safe systems.” One could easily find an interpretation of this phrase that
encompassed the user interface issues described above.70
67 If the reader will recall, in Granger, supra note 10, the courts recognized a duty to
provide “safe systems.”
68 Vuchar, supra note 14 in which hospitals were held liable for injury caused by inade-
quate equipment.
69 Similarly, issues of completeness or overload are not straightforwardly addressed by
the concept of “adequacy.” Whether a system is biased towards providing the user with
too much information (as in the case of a DSS) is a matter of systems design, with no
clear normative standards at play to serve as guides.
70 For instance, juxtaposition errors are fairly obvious design flaws that can impact pa-
tient safety.
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Despite this initial appeal, it is not sure the concept of a “safe system” can be
extended to deal with the other issues that we identified above.
• First, from the case law, the scope of these duties seems to extend to
policies and procedures that impact safety and quality of care. The courts
explicitly highlight the need for written documents binding staff members
to follow certain work processes. None of the issues that we have identi-
fied can be dealt with by policies and procedures alone, as they are inher-
ent in the architecture and design of the ICT systems in question.
• Second, since any system has unanticipated uses (no matter how safely
engineered), the concept of safety is not adequate for dealing with risks
arising from this category of error.
• Third, extending the concept of “safety” to cover completeness, work-
flow, loss of communication and overload risks may be stretching the
concept too far. Just about any hospital procedure can be interpreted to
impact patient safety, including payroll and collective bargaining proce-
dures.71 Some of the risks that we have outlined have implications for
patient safety, but they are not inherently about safety. For instance, over-
load issues are just as much about cognitive impairment and job perform-
ance as they are about safety.
• Fourth, in many of our risks, safety issues lurk on both sides. Taking the
issue of overload issues as an example, there are at least two competing
arguments: (1) swamping clinicians with alerts creates safety issues by
distracting them from other tasks, and; (2) not alerting clinicians creates
safety issues by foregoing an opportunity to inform them of critical de-
velopments in a patient’s trajectory of care.
We conclude, therefore, that the current common law approach to direct duties
is not sufficient to deal with the issues arising from the use of ICT in health care.
Absent a stronger duty of care, there are significant gaps in the common law’s
ability to address these issues.
(ii) Is the Law of Vicarious Liability Sufficient?
In our brief review of the jurisprudence, we saw that institutions are liable for
actions of the majority of health care professionals, including nurses and residents.
The Supreme Court (commenting on vicarious liability in general) has stated that in
determining employee status, the courts should examine the total relationship be-
tween the parties, including factors such as control, opportunity for profit, and the
degree of responsibility for management held by the worker.
Unfortunately, the law of vicarious liability is even less useful than the law of
direct duties when it comes to addressing the errors we identified above. The main
problem is that these errors are typically not the fault of staff members such as
nurses, occupational therapists and imaging technologists. Instead, they are sys-
temic, arising from the complex interactions between humans and software. As we
have argued elsewhere, it would be difficult (and pointless) to try to attribute these
71 After all, if staff members go on strike, patients suffer.
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systemic errors to the failings of individual practitioners.72 If we are to argue that
the hospital should be liable for systemic errors arising from ICT, it should be on a
different ground than vicarious liability.
(iii) The Tension between Institutions and Individual Practitioners
The jurisprudence pertaining to institutional liability is generally biased to-
wards pinning responsibility for the quality of care onto physicians. In an age
where hospitals were mere locations rented out by independent physician contrac-
tors, this tendency made perfect sense. However, modern health care has tran-
scended this model in numerous ways. Not only is the complexity of care delivery
much greater, but institutions are deploying ICT systems that have profound effects
on health care practitioners. Hospitals may not exert full control over physicians
and allied health professionals, but their power to adopt policies and procedures
(e.g., quality of care, privacy) does grant them some measure of control. One of the
novel contributions of this work is to point out that ICT has a more significant
effect on health care practitioners than any policy could hope to achieve. ICT can
not only influence workflows, but basic cognitive processes. Institutions are in a
position to drastically influence the ability of health care professionals to make ob-
servations, reason about evidence, formulate plans and execute them. The systems
that institutions put into place not only constrain practitioners, but transform their
thought processes.
This is an important fact, as it has implications for the liability of health care
professionals. In Wilson v. Swanson,73 the Supreme Court of Canada considered
several issues, including the standard of care required for surgeons. Justice Rand,
speaking for the majority, stated that “[w]hat the surgeon by his ordinary engage-
ment undertakes with the patient is that he possesses the skill knowledge and judg-
ment of the generality or average of the special group or class of technicians to
which he belongs and will faithfully exercise them.”74 The jurisprudence has previ-
ously assumed that the exercise of skill, knowledge and judgment by a physician is
independent of the control of the hospital. ICT invalidates this assumption. For in-
stance, ICT may result in distraction, cognitive impairment, alert fatigue and other
psychological impacts. Judgment may be impaired by completeness issues (the in-
ability to source the most important information in time), or by overload from DSS
systems.
While it may be the case that courts grappling with particular cases may rec-
ognize that an institution shares fault with a physician for errors arising from ICT,
this result is by no means assured. Recognizing the impacts of ICT is a first step in
developing a robust and considered response to the challenges of liability in this
area.
(d) Is it Time for a New Direct Duty of Care?
In this section, we consider some arguments for adopting a new duty of care.
72 Williams & Kuziemsky, supra note 5.
73 [1956] S.C.R. 804, 5 D.L.R. (2d) 113.
74 Ibid at 811.
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As indicated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper v. Hobart,75 the “Anns”
test76 is a useful framework by which courts may decide whether a new duty of
care should be recognized. The Anns test has two components: (1) a proximity
branch, which analyzes whether the harm was the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quence of the defendant’s act, and; (2) a policy branch, which asks whether there
are reasons (notwithstanding the analysis in the proximity analysis) that tort liabil-
ity should not be recognized.77 We discuss both branches below.
(i) The Proximity Branch
This component of the Anns test focuses on factors arising from the relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the defendant. The seminal case of McAlister
(Donoghue) v. Stevenson78 established that: (1) a person can be held liable only for
reasonably foreseeable harm, and; (2) not all reasonably foreseeable harm will re-
sult in liability. Indeed, the Anns test buttresses reasonable foreseeability of the
harm with considerations of proximity. If foreseeability and proximity are estab-
lished at the first stage, a prima facie duty of care arises.79
With respect to the notion of proximity, the term has been used to describe
certain “close and direct” relationships between the plaintiff and defendant.80 Ac-
cording to the Court in Cooper, “[d]efining the relationship may involve looking at
expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved.
Essentially, these are factors that allow us to evaluate the closeness of the relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the defendant and to determine whether it is just and
fair having regard to that relationship to impose a duty of care in law upon the
75 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 [Cooper].
76 The Anns test was introduced in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1978] A.C.
728 (H.L.) [Anns].
77 Cooper, supra note 74 at para. 30. Also useful is the formulation of the Anns test in
Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth (Regional Municipality) Police Services Board, 2007 SCC
41 at para. 20, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129 [Hill], where the Court stated that “[t]he test for
determining whether a person owes a duty of care involves two questions: (1) Does the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant disclose sufficient foreseeability
and proximity to establish a prima facie duty of care; and (2) If so, are there any
residual policy considerations which ought to negate or limit that duty of care?”
78 [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
79 Cooper, supra note 4 at para. 30.
80 The Court in Cooper cited the following statement by Lord Atkin in Anns: “Who then,
in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be — persons who are so closely and
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as
being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are
called in question . . . I think that this sufficiently states the truth if proximity be not
confined to mere physical proximity, but be used, as I think it was intended, to extend
to such close and direct relations that the act complained of directly affects a person
whom the person alleged to be bound to take care would know would be directly af-
fected by his careless act.” (Anns, supra note 75 at 580) Lord Atkin further claimed
that a defendant “must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour” (Anns at 580).
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defendant.”81 The Court further notes that these factors are diverse, and depend on
the circumstances of the case. Of particular utility are the categories of negligence,
by which novel situations may be compared and classified; indeed, proximity may
be established by reference to them.82 These categories are not closed.83
Considering ICT-based medical error, there seems to be a prima facie case for
proximity. First, errors by medical practitioners have been recognized as a category
of negligence.84 Second, many of the factors outlined in Cooper will be significant.
To take but a single example, we say that the courts have recognized (e.g.,
Yepremian)85 that patients have strong expectations of health care institutions, in-
cluding trustworthiness, confidentiality, safety and quality of care. There seems to
be no shortage of material from which to craft an argument that a close connection
exists between institutions and patients.
Unfortunately, the major issue with ICT-based medical error concerns the re-
quirement of foreseeability. First, many of these errors are not predictable until a
system is brought into operation. Second, a large number of these errors result not
from the system itself, but from the way in which individual users adapt their beha-
viour in response to it. Third, many ICT-related errors are low probability. It is an
axiom of process re-engineering that improvements to any business (let alone
health care) carry a certain element of risk.86 Stalling improvements to health care
on the basis that they carry some residual risk of unpredictable error might result in
worse outcomes in the long term.87
81 Cooper, supra note 74 at para. 34.
82 Ibid at para. 31.
83 The Court in Hill, supra note 76 at para. 25, explains: “From time to time, claims are
made that relationships hitherto unconsidered by courts support a duty of care giving
rise to legal liability. When such cases arise, the courts must consider whether the
claim for sufficient proximity is established. If it is, and the prima facie duty is not
negated for policy reasons at the second stage of the Anns test, the new category will
thereafter be recognized as capable of giving rise to a duty of care and legal liability.”
84 Although we do not have space to investigate this claim, an argument could be made
that institutional liability should fall under the category of professional negligence by
health care practitioners. See our discussion on fiduciary obligations below for relevant
material.
85 Supra note 17. It is interesting to note that one of the reasons that the court in
Yepremian declined to impose liability on the hospital concerned the presence of an
independent (non-employee) physician, who likely carried insurance for such eventual-
ities. In the case of ICT-based medical error, the ultimate cause is systemic, and there-
fore not typically attributable to the failings of individual practitioners. If Yepremian
had involved this type of circumstance, the court may have been compelled to delve
more deeply into the relevance of a new duty of care.
86 For instance, introducing a new airline booking system will ultimately improve effi-
ciency, but at the risk of disrupting operations and causing major losses in the short
term.
87 We return to this theme below, when we discuss the deterrence objective.
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(ii) The Policy Branch
In this stage of the Anns test, the court must consider whether there are
“residual policy considerations outside the relationship of the parties that may neg-
ative the imposition of a duty of care.”88 Since a thorough answer to this question
is beyond the scope of this work, we content ourselves with a discussion of policy
concerns that is organized according to the overarching goals of the law of torts.
Goal 1) Compensation:
On the positive side, there are several reasons for thinking that a new duty of
care would serve the compensation objective. First, this objective may be frustrated
if a new duty is not recognized, since a plaintiff who has suffered loss caused by
systemic errors will likely be unable to show that individual health care practition-
ers (whether consultants or employees) were at fault.89 Second, courts sympathetic
to the loss distribution theory of tort law90 should consider the possible advantages
of transferring losses to the organizations deploying such systems, enticing them to
improve their practices through making ICT deployment more expensive.
On the negative side, we note that courts should be wary of imposing addi-
tional costs on the health care system. Most health care institutions in Canada are
publically funded, receiving most of their operating budgets from various levels of
government, and not from user fees. Imposing additional costs on a health care
system that is overburdened is a prospect that courts have not embraced whole-
heartedly in the past.
In addition, the empirical evidence does not provide strong support for the
efficacy of tort-based compensation. As noted by Brine,91 very few patients who
suffer injuries during stays in hospital receive any form of compensation for their
loss. Recent research suggests that less than 10% of viable claims result in compen-
sation.92 Another issue is that the assessment of damages and compensation in the
tort law system may be unpredictable, subjective, and predisposed to awarding
large sums to patients who fit common patterns of injuries.93 This is a critical issue
for ICT-related medical error, which are typically unpredictable, and capable of
88 Cooper, supra note 74 at para. 30. At para. 39, the court states that “[t]he second step
of Anns generally arises only in cases where the duty of care asserted does not fall
within a recognized category of recovery. Where it does, we may be satisfied that there
are no overriding policy considerations that would negative the duty of care.”
89 The case of Frandle v. MacKenzie (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 190, 5 C.C.L.T. (2d) 113
(C.A.) serves as an example of a case in which the courts were willing to apportion
fault between a hospital and its contractor physicians. However, this case did not in-
volve systemic errors, so much as errors of judgment in a simple workflow.
90 A.M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 6th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1997) at 5.
91 For a discussion of the difficulties of using tort as a means of compensating patients
who have incurred loss as a result of medical error, see Andrew Brine, “Medical Mal-
practice and the Goals of Tort Law” (2003) 11 Health Law J. 241 at 244.
92 R.G. Elgie, T.A. Caulfield & M.I. Christie, “Medical Injuries and Malpractice: Is it
time for no-fault?” (1993) 1 Health Law J. 97 at 99 (cited in Brine, supra note 90).
93 Robert E. Astroff, “Show me the money!: Making the case for no-fault medical mal-
practice insurance” (1996) 5:3 Health L. Rev. 9 at 9 (cited in Brine, supra note 90).
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occurring at low frequencies.94 A tort system that is biased against low frequency
errors may not be a good mechanism for providing compensation in this context.
Goal 2) Deterrence:
As describe in Linden,95 three types of deterrence have been identified by le-
gal scholars: (1) specific deterrence; (2) general deterrence, and; (3) market deter-
rence.96 Specific deterrence focuses on the particular defendant, with the aim of
encouraging her to alter her conduct. General deterrence aims at changing the be-
haviour of all members of society, by providing them with disincentives to engage
in tortuous conduct. Lastly, market deterrence focuses on activities, as opposed to
individuals; the goal is to make activities that are prone to accidents more expen-
sive, by forcing those connected to them to bear the costs associated with tortuous
incidents.
From an initial impression, it looks as though recognition of a new duty of
care for ICT-based medical error may be compatible with the deterrence objective.
Institutions facing liability for systemic errors may take more care in future; they
may also pass costs along to the vendors and systems integrators who are responsi-
ble for designing and implementing the system.
Unfortunately, the situation is a bit more nuanced than an initial glance might
convey. First, many of the errors associated with health care ICT are: (a) subtle; (b)
impossible to predict, and; (c) visible only after the system is in operation. Apart
from the fact that there are no best practices or sound methodologies to avoid some
of these issues, we noted above that some risk is inherent in attempting any form of
improvement in health care delivery. Discouraging institutions from carrying out
upgrades and improvements to the health care system on the basis of unknowable
residual risk is not a policy objective that many courts or lawmakers will embrace
with relish.97
Second, specific deterrence will fail if an organization is dealing with a sys-
tems-level error resulting from complex interactions. Unless the organization is
omniscient, it will have only a dim grasp of how the error came to pass. Even with
the information furnished by an investigation, the organization may be hard pressed
to avoid errors of this type in future; indeed, they may never occur again, due to the
fact that many ICT-based errors are highly dependent on the right confluence of
circumstances. Complex, systems-level issues cannot be addressed using piece-
meal, reactive mechanisms like tort actions; instead, they must be addressed using
94 Although some classes of error (e.g., errors in technical infrastructure and communica-
tions systems) may affect many patients at the same time, many of the errors that we
have discussed will arise less frequently, harming one patient at a time. The variability
in the frequency and scope of ICT-based medical error is one of the reasons that it is
difficult to address using standard risk management techniques.
95 Supra note 89.
96 P.H. Osborne, The Law of Torts (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) at 13.
97 One could argue that frustrating advances in health care delivery methods could result
in greater harm over the long term. Due to space constraints, we do not pursue this line
of thought in this work.
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broad, collaborative, and comprehensive approaches.98
Lastly, public safety scholars have raised concerns about the deterrence value
of tort law in the context of medical errors. One of the major issues is the phenome-
non of defensive medicine, described by Astroff as “the unnecessary use of medical
resources to protect against lawsuits and the refusal to provide care or adopt new
methods of treatment for fear of increased liability exposure . . .”99 As Brine notes,
some defensive medicine can be beneficial for patients, as in the case of a physician
who increases her attention to detail, and seeks secondary opinions from col-
leagues.100 It may also stimulate organizations to fund risk management and qual-
ity assurance activities.101 On the other hand, it could also decrease the willingness
of organizations to experiment with new care delivery methods. On an empirical
level, Elgie et al conclude that “[t]he best estimate is that tort law has only a tan-
gential effect on the quality of health care.”102
Goal 3) Psychological Redress:
A new duty of care may fulfill important aims of tort law connected to human
psychology. In Linden’s words, tort law may counteract the feelings of alienation
and despair that are evoked in a society in which large institutions that control
many aspects of life (e.g., government agencies) have become “too large and
impersonal.”103
98 For a defense of this claim, see Australia, Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy
Perspective (Sydney, Commonwealth of Australia: Australian Public Service Commis-
sion, 2007). Interestingly enough, research shows that complex cases are more likely to
lead to malpractice claims. See S.L. Clark et al, “Improved outcomes, fewer caesarean
deliveries, and reduced litigation: results of a new paradigm in patient safety” (2008)
105 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 199.
Additionally, various researchers have noted the fact that medical errors are often due
to other systematic issues such as poor communication or information flows. They fur-
ther claim that these systematic issues will still exist, regardless of the state of malprac-
tice suits or tort law developed to prevent errors. See, for instance, Ash et al, supra note
46 and R. Koppel et al, supra note 60.
99 Supra note 98 at 12.
100 A recent article has claimed that physicians may be biased to treat patients in a mech-
anistic manner, creating an atmosphere conducive to the occurrence of error. The same
article cites a breakdown in the patient-physician relationship as a driver of defensive
medicine. See W. Kondro, “Medical errors increasing because of complexity of care
and breakdown in doctor-patient relationship, physician consultant says” (2010) 182:13
CMAJ e645.
101 Brine, supra note 90 at 252.
102 Supra note 91.
103 Linden, supra note 89 at 18. Systemic errors that cause injury are by definition imper-
sonal, as there is no single agent who can be blamed for the loss.
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Goal 4) Education:
Some scholars have promoted tort law as a means of providing education.104
As Klar notes, many losses tend to occur through ignorance, rather than through
intentional adoption of more risky forms of behaviour.105 Second, tort law may
serve to reinforce key cultural or moral values. According to Linden, tort law en-
shrines some of the traditional moral principles of Anglo-American society,106
such as the notion of individual responsibility. Third, tort law may reinforce atti-
tudes of respect for human dignity, and of the importance of recognizing individual
interests.
While a direct duty of care for ICT-based error may provide some reinforce-
ment of the dignity of the individual, it is clear that there are major deficiencies on
the other fronts. First of all, the type of education function alluded to by Klar works
where an individual is confronted with a set of options, of which several are unac-
ceptably risky. It is not clear that education works with an institution that is presen-
ted with unknown, unanticipated and system level risks associated with deployment
of ostensibly useful information technology. Second, the notion of individual re-
sponsibility is not particularly useful in dealing with losses arising from systemic
errors that by definition are not the result of the failings of an identifiable set of
individuals.
(iii) Other Considerations
One of the main challenges with defining a duty of care in support of tort
liability for institutions is the difficulty involved in formulating a proper standard
of care. In the case of health care ICT, we have seen that many of the major risks
that arise are impossible to anticipate, manifesting themselves only after a system
has been put into operation and the transformation of user behaviour has begun to
occur. In many cases, there may be no way to design a system that lacks risks, and
any modification will merely trade off one set of risks for another. This complexity
(together with the novelty of the domain) make it difficult to formulate systems
engineering practices that would serve as a standard of care for institutions de-
ploying ICT systems. There is simply no body of art or expertise to rely upon in
evaluating whether an institution met the standard of care. Of course, some errors
may be so glaringly obvious and predictable that courts may feel that liability is
warranted, but this would be an exceptional case. As we stated above, in order to
improve health care, some risks must be taken, and some lessons learned. The na-
ture of the complex interactions between ICT systems and health care practitioners
means that some of these lessons will be learned the hard way.
(e) Alternatives to a New Duty of Care
Lastly, we should mention that there are at least two alternatives open to those
104 In the healthcare domain, tort is particularly effective in this regard if the results of
lawsuits are taken up and disseminated by the media, trade associations or industry
groups.
105 L.N. Klar, Tort Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 15.
106 Linden, supra note 89 at 14.
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sympathetic to the plight of patients who have incurred ICT-related losses.
(i) No Fault Compensation
While the literature on this topic is far too expansive for us to provide an
overview in this work, we should mention that no-fault compensation schemes
might be an attractive alternative to imposing liability on institutions through tort
law. Since the public would bear the cost of the liability in either case, this ap-
proach would have the advantage of further burdening an overtaxed court system.
In addition, since individuals suffering from ICT-related medical error are unlikely
to achieve psychological gratification from a court case, the impersonal and face-
less nature of no-fault compensation is not a drawback.107
(ii) Fiduciary Duties
A second alternative involves the law of fiduciary duties.108 Although it is
difficult to succinctly define the notion of a fiduciary duty precisely, a fiduciary is
an actor who is required to look after the interests of others with vigilance, dedica-
tion and selflessness.109 A fiduciary voluntarily accepts legal constraints upon its
ability to act; as a result, self-interested actions that violate the fiduciary duty are
not merely ethical transgressions, but breaches of a legal duty.
In considering the utility of the law of fiduciary duties to the problem of ICT-
related medical error, we must ascertain: (1) what relevant fiduciary duties exist,
and; (2) what obligations follow from them. While Canadian courts have unequivo-
cally recognized a physician’s fiduciary duties to her patient,110 the jurisprudence
on institutional duties is less clear. Litman argues that the indicia111 of fiduciary
107 In cases of systematic error (particularly where multiple institutions are involved), it is
unlikely that legal action will identify an individual who is responsible for the loss. The
distributed fault inherent in systems-level issues makes it difficult for a claimant to take
solace in the knowledge that the right people have been “taught a lesson.”
108 Due to space constraints, we can only make a preliminary investigation into the utility
of fiduciary law for addressing ICT-related medical error.
109 For a detailed discussion of the nature of fiduciary duties, see M.M. Litman, “Fiduciary
Law and For-Profit and Not-For Profit Health Care”, in Timothy A. Caulfield & Bar-
bara von Tigerstrom, eds., Health Care Reform and the Law in Canada: Meeting the
Challenge (Edmonton, Alta.: University of Alberta Press, 2002) 85 [Litman, “For-
Profit”].
110 For a recent example, see McInerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, 93 D.L.R.
(4th) 415 in which the Court held at para. 28 that a physician’s fiduciary duty can be
superseded by concerns that are “connected to the safety of individuals or of the public
. . .”
111 Helpful guidance on recognizing fiduciary relationships was introduced in Frame v.
Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99 at para. 60, 42 D.L.R. (4th) 81, in which Justice Wilson set
out three characteristics (indicia) seemingly possessed by fiduciaries. First, they have
the scope for the exercise of some discretion or power. Second, they can affect the
legal or practical interests of beneficiaries through the unilateral exercise of their dis-
cretion or power. Third, beneficiaries are peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of
fiduciaries holding the discretion or power.
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duties are not an “impediment” to the claim that health care providers and health
authorities are fiduciaries,112 noting that: (1) patients are almost always at the
“mercy” of their health care providers; (2) patients are vulnerable and completely
dependent on the institution in which they are receiving care; (3) institutions and
their staff have specialized and sophisticated knowledge, and are gatekeepers with
respect to important services, procedures and drugs, and; (4) patients have very
little scope to personally take precautions to avoid the risks posed by the
institution.113
However, the presence of these factors is not conclusive of the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. As an empirical matter, fiduciary duties are often demar-
cated by pledges of loyalty, and the Supreme Court has developed test to recognize
them, namely: (1) an undertaking by a party to selflessly and exclusively dedicate
oneself to the interests of another; (2) a reasonable expectation of such dedication,
or; (3) a reasonable basis for reliance on such a dedication.114 Factors determining
whether such a reasonable expectation exists include: (a) the presence or absence
of “trust” and “confidence”; (b) the sophistication of the services being provided,
and; (c) the level of fidelity implicated in relevant community and industry
standards.115
Litman claims there is “good reason to believe that fiduciary obligations owed
to patients [by physicians] extend beyond physicians to other health care providers
. . . as well as to hospitals and health authorities.”116 His arguments are: (1) that the
early trends in the case law support this; (2) that the propensity for institutions to
enact policies, procedures, protocols and practice guidelines indicates commitments
or pledges to dedicated service; (3) that certain legislative trends align with this
view; (4) the roles of non-physician health care providers suggest that they have the
same fundamental mandate as physicians;117 (5) the case law is compatible with
this claim, with the courts having agreed that the fiduciary status of health care
institutions is an issue to be established on the facts of each case.118
Even if Litman is correct, an attempt to use fiduciary duties to establish insti-
tutional liability for ICT-related medical error will founder when one ponders the
obligations owed by institutions (as fiduciaries) to patients. One of the dominant
themes in the jurisprudence is that a fiduciary must “promote the best interests” of
beneficiaries.119 In short, it is difficult to argue that ICT-related medical errors are
112 M. Litman, “Fiduciary Law in the Hospital Context” (2007) 15 Health Law J. 295 at
307 [Litman, “Hospital Context”].
113 These reasons can also be invoked in arguing that hospitals have a duty of care.
114 Litman, “For-Profit”, supra note 108 at 89.
115 Litman, “Hospital Context”, supra note 111 at 311, citing Justice La Forest in
Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 117 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
116 Ibid.
117 In particular, Litman cites the use of health care teams. For more on this issue, see our
recent paper, supra note 5.
118 Litman, “Hospital Context”, supra note 111 at 317.
119 Ibid at 319. This duty to act in the “best interests” of a beneficiary can be overridden by
other objectives in compelling circumstances. Examples from the hospital context in-
clude prioritization (e.g., scheduling surgeries) and cost containment. As a matter of
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a violation of this type of duty. First, these errors arise when institutions deploy
new systems in an effort to improve their health care delivery methods;120 this does
not fit the model of a failure to respect “best interests.” Second, many of the fiduci-
ary issues that arise in medical contexts are analyzed by the courts with the help of
concepts like “trust” and “confidence”; while applicable to many situations, it is
difficult to see how these apply to ICT-based medical error. Third, Litman notes
that the “gravamen of fiduciary misconduct is a failure of loyalty.”121 The courts
may have a difficult time interpreting failures in systems design and implementa-
tion as a failure of loyalty. The errors that we outlined in previous sections are
difficult to anticipate, arising only when systems are deployed in a health care envi-
ronment. In doing so, institutions are not deliberately overriding best interests; in
fact, they undertake projects precisely to improve either the quality or efficiency of
care.
CONCLUSION
This work has concerned itself with errors arising from the introduction of
ICT systems into health care settings. We have seen that health care ICT can have
profound impacts on the health care practitioners who interact with it. The intro-
duction of ICT into health care institutions can transform workflows, disrupt com-
munication, and result in profound impacts on the cognitive abilities of clinicians.
These impacts can be so powerful that they eclipse other control mechanisms used
by health care institutions, such as policies and procedures.
The medical errors that can arise from healthcare ICT are numerous. Most of
them are difficult to rectify, and almost impossible to anticipate in advance of a
system actually being put into an operational environment. Many of the errors that
result are system-level issues, not attributable to the failings of individual care
providers. Other forms of errors occur when clinicians are affected by the cognitive
impacts of healthcare ICT, resulting in losses apparently caused by individual prac-
titioners, but ultimately traceable to systems-level concerns.
In this paper, we argued that holding individual practitioners accountable for
systems-level errors is untenable. At some point, systems-level actors must take
responsibility. As a result, we investigated mechanisms by which institutions could
be held liable for their ICT initiatives. After discovering that the current law of
direct duties and vicarious liability was not up to the task, we engaged in a high
level discussion of whether a new duty of care is warranted. Examining the ratio-
nales of tort law and the difficulties involved in formulating a standard of care, we
noted that many problems lie in wait for proponents of this approach. As alterna-
tives, we mentioned the law of fiduciaries, as well as no-fault compensation
schemes.
Due to the complexity of the issues involved, we could only make a prelimi-
nary effort to address institutional liability for healthcare ICT related error. Al-
general interest, Litman mentions that the best interest test makes sense in the context
of health care, as health care decisions involve a “limited number of alternatives.” We
do not have space to pursue this avenue of thought.
120 As we noted in the case of tort law, improvements come with a price tag.
121 Litman, “Hospital Context”, supra note 111 at 324.
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though we are not certain of which direction will be most appealing to the courts,
we are entirely certain that this type of error will become more frequent as health
care becomes more complex. It is well past time to revisit the liability of health
care institutions. 
